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Abstract—As scaling is more and more aggressive, intermittent 
faults are increasing their importance in current deep submicron 
complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) 
technologies. This work shows the dependability assessment of a 
fault-tolerant computer system against intermittent faults. The 
applied methodology lies in VHDL-Based Fault Injection, which 
allows the assessment in early design phases, together with a high 
level of observability and controllability. The evaluated system is 
a duplex microcontroller system with cold stand-by sparing. A 
wide set of intermittent fault models have been injected, and 
from the simulation traces, coverages and latencies have been 
measured. Markov models for this system have been generated 
and some dependability functions, such as reliability and safety, 
have been calculated. From these results, some enhancements of 
detection and recovery mechanisms have been suggested. The 
methodology presented is general to any fault-tolerant computer 
system.  
 
Index Terms— Fault injection, Hardware description 
languages, Intermittent faults, Dependability, Markov models 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ELIABILITY has become a major challenge in current 
computer systems. The feature size scaling of very-large-
scale-of-integration (VLSI) integrated circuits, together 
with the reduction of the supply voltage, the increase of 
transistor speed and the significant sensitivities to temperature 
and electromagnetic noise, have led to the apparition of new 
faults. In this context, intermittent faults are increasingly 
important in current deep submicron complementary metal-
oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technologies [1]. New defects, 
residues, process variations and wear-out mechanisms may 
provoke intermittent faults. These faults occur non-
deterministically at the same location due to unstable or 
marginal hardware. Although errors induced by transient and 
intermittent faults manifest in a similar way, intermittent faults 
are activated repeatedly in the same place, and hence, they are 
usually grouped in bursts. Additionally, intermittent faults 
may be activated or deactivated by changes in temperature, 
voltage or frequency [2]. 
Transient and permanent faults have been deeply studied and 
their models are well established [3], [4]. Permanent faults are 
provoked by irreversible physical defects caused by 
manufacturing defects and wear-out mechanisms. Transient 
faults are commonly generated by environmental conditions, 
like electromagnetic interferences or cosmic radiation. Instead, 
intermittent faults have been traditionally much less studied, 
and they have been typically considered as the prelude of 
permanent faults provoked by wear-out processes. In this way, 
intermittent fault models have been usually assimilated to 
those corresponding to permanent faults.  
Nevertheless, their characterization is very complex, as they 
appear randomly and manifest in high rate bursts that can 
disappear and appear later. In recent works, deeper studies 
have been carried out using logged errors provoked by 
intermittent faults in real computing systems [1], [2], [5]. In 
these works, frequent sources of errors and their manifestation 
have been analyzed, and some mitigation techniques are 
suggested. 
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In former works, we have studied the impact of intermittent 
faults in different microprocessors (with both complex 
instruction set computing (CISC) and reduced instruction set 
computing (RISC) architectures) at gate and register-transfer 
abstraction levels [6], [7], [8]. From the analysis of real logged 
faults and the study of the physical mechanisms involved, we 
have generated new fault models for intermittent faults. Then, 
we have injected these intermittent fault models into the 
VHDL models of these systems. Finally, from the simulation 
traces obtained in the injection experiments, failures and latent 
errors have been registered, and the influence of different fault 
parameters has been analyzed. Other works in the literature 
have studied the impact of intermittent faults at higher 
abstraction levels (application programs) [9], [10], and they all 
show similar results as in [6], [7] and [8] regarding the 
influence of fault parameters and sensitivities. 
In the present work, we go a step further and assess the 
dependability of a fault-tolerant (FT) computer system against 
intermittent faults. This is related to another research area in 
intermittent faults: the design and validation of fault tolerance 
mechanisms to cope with intermittent faults. In early tentative 
works, a FT microcomputer system was partially assessed. In 
[11], transient and permanent faults were injected, and 
coverages and latencies were calculated. In [12], intermittent 
faults were injected in some prospective targets, and their 
impact on the behavior of the detection and recovery 
mechanisms was analyzed. The objective of the present work 
is to complete the evaluation process against intermittent 
faults, as we explain in the following paragraphs. 
Fig. 1 summarizes the methodology followed. First, fault 
models for intermittent faults are deduced, and injected in the 
VHDL model of the FT system (left branch of the graph). 
From the analysis of the faulty simulation traces, coverages 
and latencies are measured. This information can be used, in a 
feedback process (represented with dashed lines), to improve 
the Fault Tolerance Mechanisms and update the system, and 
hence, its VHDL model. Next, coverage values are introduced 
in the Markov model of the system, generated to represent the 
behavior of the FT system in the presence of intermittent 
faults. Some dependability functions, such as reliability and 
safety, are obtained by solving the Markov model. Finally, 
these results can be compared to those obtained using other 
fault tolerance approaches, for instance applying alternative 
redundancy techniques. The overall process can be repeated 
iteratively in a feedback path to enhance the design. We have 
applied a VHDL-Based Fault Injection technique for two main 
reasons: i) it allows the assessment in early phases of the 
system design; and ii) it permits high controllability and 
observability of the experiments. 
Other related works evaluate intermittent error recovery 
configurations at a high level. Some of these configurations 
are similar to those of our paper. For instance, [13] models a 
multicore system at the functional level, while [14] models a 
multiprocessor chip based on Stochastic Activity Networks. In 
these works, no dependability functions (such as reliability, 
safety, etc.) are obtained. Instead, some performance 
estimators (such as throughput, latency, overhead, useful 
work, etc.) are calculated. On the other hand, in [15] the 
tolerance to intermittent faults is designed at the algorithm 
level and applied to a distributed system. A formal proof 
establishes its correctness. From this point of view, our paper 
may strengthen dependability assessment, introducing some 
novelties with respect to the related literature. 
In summary, the contribution of our paper with respect to 
related literature consists in: i) Calculating coverages and 
latencies for intermittent faults; ii) Generating Markov models 
of the FT system in the presence of intermittent faults; iii) 
Obtaining dependability functions to assess the FT system. 
The methodology presented in this work is general, and it can 
be applied to any FT system at an early phase of the design. 
This work is organized as follows. Section II depicts the 
fault models for intermittent faults. Section III introduces the 
fault injection technique used. Section IV describes the fault-
tolerant system and the main components of the VHDL model. 
Sections II to IV match with the left branch in Fig. 1. Section 
V explains the parameters of the fault injection experiments. 
Section VI discusses the results obtained regarding the 
coverages and latencies. Sections V and VI correspond to the 
“Detection/recovery coverages and latencies” box in Fig. 1. 
Section VII describes the Markov models generated and some 
results obtained about the reliability and safety of the system. 
This section covers the right branch in Fig. 1. Finally, Section 
VIII provides some conclusions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Methodology for the Dependability assessment against intermittent faults. 
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TABLE I.  
INTERMITTENT FAULT MECHANISMS AND MODELS [7] 
Causes Targets Fault mechanisms Type of fault Fault models 
Residues in cells Memory and registers Intermittent contacts Manufacturing defect Intermittent stuck-at 







Variation of metal resistance 
Voids 




Crosstalk I/O connections  
Buses 
 
Electromagnetic interference Internal noise 
Timing 
 
Intermittent pulse  
Intermittent delay 
Intermittent speed-up 





Intermittent indetermination  
Negative bias-temperature 
instability (NBTI) 
PMOS transistors in combinational 
logic 
Increase of transistor threshold 
voltage VTH 
Reduction of carrier mobility   




PMOS transistors in SRAM cells Local mismatches among cell 
transistors, decrease of static 
noise margin 
Wearout Intermittent bit-flip 
 
Hot-carrier injection (HCI) NMOS transistors in combinational 
logic 
Increase of transistor threshold 
voltage VTH 
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
 
Low-k dielectric breakdown Buses 
I/O connections 
Leakage current fluctuation 
Temperature variations 
Capacity degradation 
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
Intermittent short 
 
Doping profile and gate length 
deviations 
MOS transistors in combinational 
logic and memory 
Deviations in VTH 
Deviations in operation speed 
Manufacturing variations Intermittent delay 
 
 
II. INTERMITTENT FAULT MODELING 
An intermittent fault is defined as a fault that appears 
sporadically at the same hardware location, and lasts for one 
or more clock cycles [14]. Intermittent faults can be activated 
by environmental changes such as temperature, voltage or 
frequency alterations. In addition, manufacturing defects, 
process variations and special wear-out processes can also lead 
to such faults. In some cases, intermittent faults can evolve to 
permanent faults due to aging mechanisms. The introduction 
of new deep submicron technologies accentuates the 
occurrence of intermittent faults and makes necessary to study 
their new fault causes and mechanisms. 
Whereas transient and permanent fault models have been 
traditionally well established, modeling intermittent faults is a 
pending issue [1]. The unpredictable behavior of intermittent 
faults makes it difficult to define fault models. In previous 
works we have deduced a set of fault models at the logic and 
register-transfer abstraction levels which can be simulated into 
VHDL models [6], [7]. These fault models are summarized in 
Table I. 
As stated previously, intermittent faults manifest in bursts. 
To model these faults, the following parameters must be 
specified (see Fig. 2) [8]: the number of fault activations in the 
burst (or burst length, LBurst), the duration of each activation 
(or activity time, tA), and the separation between two 
consecutive activations (or inactivity time, tI). For the sake of 
simplicity, all three parameters have been generated according 
to uniform distribution functions. 
III. FAULT INJECTION ENVIRONMENT 
In this paper, we use a VHDL-based fault injection 
technique, which is a simulation-based technique. This 
technique allows the assessment of the system in early design 
phases. And due to the features of the VHDL modeling 
language, this technique provides high controllability and 
observability of the injection experiments, as it permits the 
modification and monitoring of every element in the system. 
Fig. 3 shows different ways to implement the VHDL-based 
fault injection techniques [16] [4]: 
 
 
Fig. 2. Main elements of a burst of an intermittent fault. 
 
 
Fig. 3. VHDL-based fault injection techniques. 
 
The simulator-commands-based fault injection (or simply 
simulator-commands) technique consists in modifying the 
value or timing of the signals and/or variables of the VHDL 
model at simulation time, by using special commands of the 
simulator. 
The saboteurs-based fault injection (or simply saboteurs) 
technique requires modifying the VHDL code of the system 
by inserting injection components called saboteurs between 
the components of the model. While inactive, a saboteur does 
nothing, but when activated it can alter the value or timing 
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occurrence of faults. 
The mutants-based fault injection (or mutants) technique 
also requires modifying the VHDL code of the system. In this 
case, altered versions of the existing components, called 
mutants, are created. These mutated versions of the 
components present different wrong behaviors of the 
component. If no mutant is activated, the system behaves 
normally. By activating a combination of mutants, the 
occurrence of faults is simulated. 
Finally, Other techniques are implemented by extending the 
VHDL language, adding new data types and signals and 
modifying the VHDL resolution functions. The new elements 
defined include descriptions of faulty behaviors. 
Comparing the cost of implementing each method, it is 
worth to mention that: 
• The simulator-commands technique is the easiest one 
to implement, and it introduces the lowest overhead. 
• The main drawbacks of the saboteurs technique are 
two: i) it is more complex to implement than the 
simulator-commands; ii) it adds spatial overhead to 
the model. As an important advantage, it allows 
injecting a wider set of fault models. 
• The mutants technique has the same drawbacks and 
advantages as saboteurs. Moreover, it has an 
additional issue: the fault modeling becomes hard to 
apply at lower abstraction levels, because it is very 
difficult to associate VHDL code mutations to 
hardware faults. 
• The other techniques require the introduction of ad-
hoc compilers and control algorithms to manage the 
language extensions, which makes them the most 
difficult to implement. 
 
Our research group has developed a fault injection tool 
called VFIT (VHDL-based Fault Injection Tool) [4], which is 
able to inject faults by means of simulator commands, 
saboteurs and mutants techniques. 
Recent works on fault injection show other platforms that 
perform simulation-based fault injection. For example, [9] 
injects faults in a model of a simple five-stage pipeline RISC 
processor by using the Sim-Outorder processor simulator, 
while [17] injects faults on Verilog models and allows FPGA 
accelerated full-system simulation on prototype hardware . 
IV. SYSTEM UNDER STUDY 
The different fault injection experiments were carried out 
on the VHDL model of a fault-tolerant microcomputer system, 
whose block diagram is shown in Fig. 4. The system is duplex 
with cold stand-by sparing, parity detection and a watchdog 
timer [11]. Although the system under study is an academic 
FT system, its structure is common in non-critical FT systems, 
such as long-life and high availability systems [3]. 
Both the main and the spare processors are an enhanced 
version of the MARK2 processor, developed by J.R. 
Armstrong in 1989 for academic purposes [18]. It has been 
extended to 16 bits, and several FT mechanisms have been 
added. 
The structural architecture of the model is composed of the 
main and spare CPUs (CPUA and CPUB, respectively), the 
random access memory (MEM), the output parallel port 
(PORTOUT), the interrupt controller (SYSINT), the clock 
generator (CLK), the watchdog timer (WD), the pulse 
generator (GENINT), two back-off cycle generators 
(TRGENA, TRGENB) and two AND gates (PAND2A, 
PAND2B). Each component is modeled by a behavioral 
architecture with usually one or more concurrent processes. 
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To increase the system dependability, both Error Detection 
Mechanisms (EDMs) and Error Recovery Mechanisms 
(ERMs) have been incorporated. The EDMs include a parity 
check in the memory and a program control flow check 
performed by a watchdog timer. The watchdog timer 
technique implements a timing check of a process. When the 
timer goes off, the system can assume that either the processor 
is hung or a control flow error in the code of the process has 
occurred [19]. 
The ERMs include the introduction of a back-off cycle 
(instruction retry) after parity error detection, checkpointing 
when errors are detected by the watchdog timer, and starting 
the spare processor in case of permanent errors. The number 
of successive error detections required to activate the spare 
CPU can be configured in the system. 
V. FAULT INJECTION EXPERIMENTS 
A. Fault injection technique 
Faults have been injected by using VFIT, the fault injection 
tool developed by our research group. The different injection 
experiments presented in this paper have been carried out 
using the simulator-commands-based technique, because this 
technique is the easiest to apply and allows injecting all the 
fault models selected in the experiments. 
The fault injection process can be summarized in the 
following steps: 
1. Setup of parameters related to the VHDL system model 
and the fault types. 
2. Fault injection in the VHDL system model. 
3. Analysis of the experiments by comparing the golden 
run (that is, the simulation trace of the model without 
faults) with all the faulty simulation traces. 
4. Identification of faults, errors and failures. Calculation 
of the dependability estimators. 
B. Injection targets 
Intermittent faults have been injected in the main processor 
and system buses (data, address and control). In this way, 
combinational logic and storage components of the arithmetic 
and control unit have been perturbed. No faults have been 
injected in the spare processor, because it is the backup unit 
and it remains inactive while the system is not reconfigured. 
When the system reconfigures, the spare processor becomes 
the main processor and then it can be faulty. On the other 
hand, we have not considered faults in memory because this 
study focuses on processor faults. 
C. Fault models  
From the set of intermittent fault models shown in Table I, 
we have chosen the following models for the experiments: 
• Intermittent stuck-at in storage elements. We refer to 
intermittent contacts produced by manufacturing 
residues and observed in storage cells (registers and 
memory). This provokes bursts of Single Bit Errors 
(SBE) [2]. 
• Intermittent pulse in buses. 
• Intermittent {pulse, open, stuck-at, indetermination} in 
combinational logic. Intermittent contacts in the 
input/output (I/O) connections of the combinational 
logic can manifest also as intermittent stuck-at [7]. 
These contacts can be provoked by solder joints or 
aging processes, such as electromigration or 
delamination. 
 
To select these fault models, we have taken into account: 
• A set of intermittent faults observed in real computer 
systems by means of error logging [2]. 
• An analysis of representative fault mechanisms related to 
manufacturing defects and variations, as well as wear-out 
processes that can provoke intermittent faults [7]. 
• The characteristics of the VHDL model of the system. 
For instance, we have not injected time-related faults 
(such as the Intermittent Delay fault model) due to the 
lack of temporal specifications in the VHDL model. 
 
As mentioned in Section V.A, all the selected fault models 
have been injected using the simulator-commands-based fault 
injection technique. 
D. Workloads 
To activate the main components of the model, two typical 
and moderate-duration workloads have been executed: 
Arithmetic Series and Bubblesort algorithm. 
E. Number of faults 
1000 faults per experiment have been injected, being 
classified as single (one burst in a single target) or multiple 
(simultaneous bursts in different targets). It is interesting to 
stand out that multiple faults are increasingly important. Due 
to technology scaling, intermittent faults will likely affect 
multiple locations. In total, more than 60,000 faults have been 
injected. 
F. Injection instant 
For the sake of simplicity, the injection instant has been 
selected randomly along the workload duration, according to a 
uniform distribution. In real computer systems, other fault 
distributions have been observed, such as Exponential or 
Weibull [3]. For instance, a Weibull distribution with 
increasing fault rate can be used to emulate a wear out process 
that increases the frequency of intermittent faults, before 
eventually becoming permanent. Nevertheless, it can be 
challenging to set up the distribution parameters, because they 
depend on system technology and environmental factors such 
as the temperature. 
G. Burst parameters 
The burst parameters have been described in Section II. In 
this way, the number of fault activations, or burst length 
(LBurst) has been generated according to a random uniform 
distribution in the range [1, 10]. The activity and inactivity 
times (tA and tI) have been generated according to a random 
uniform distribution in the time interval [0.1T–1.0T], where T 
is the clock cycle (whose value in our experiments is 1µs). 
This is an intermediate interval between [0.01T–0.1T] and 
[1.0T–10.0T], used in other works [6]–[8]. 
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H. Analysis of results 
For each injection experiment, the simulation traces 
generated are compared to the golden run. From this 
comparison, the estimated coverages and latencies of the 
EDMs and ERMs are automatically calculated. Fig. 5 shows 
the fault pathology graph, that represents the evolution of 
faults from their injection to the detection and possible 
recovery by the FT mechanisms. 
From the experimental results, the following measures are 
obtained: 





NAct =  (1) 
where Ninj is the number of injected faults and Nact is the 
number of activated errors. A fault is called activated when it 
produces a change on a signal or variable of the model. If it 
also propagates to signals of the external structural 
architecture, then it is logged as an activated error. 
Another measure is the error detection coverage. We 
distinguish between two types of coverage estimators: 




NC =  (2) 
where Ndet is the number of errors detected by the 
EDMs. Similarly, we define the detection coverages of 
each EDM as the errors detected by the individual 










C =  
Since det(WDT))det(Paritydet NNN += , then 
d(WDT)d(Parity)d(mech) CCC +=  (3) 







=  (4) 
where Nnon_effect is the number of non effective errors, 
that is, the errors that do not affect the result of the 
running application. They are overwritten or remain 
latent in an unused part of the system. Cd(sys) extends 






CC +=  (5) 
Similarly, we calculate the error recovery coverage. Again, 
we distinguish two types of coverage estimators: 





C =  (6) 
where Ndet_rec is the number of detected errors that are 
subsequently recovered by the ERMs. As in the case of 
the EDMs, we also calculate the recovery coverages of 
each individual ERM (in this case, the back-off cycle, 















C =  
And the following relationship is accomplished: 
r(Spare)r(CP)r(Boff)r(mech) CCCC ++=  (7) 







=  (8) 
Cr(sys) extends Cr(mech) by including non effective errors 





CC +=  (9) 
 
Finally, we calculate the propagation, detection and 
recovery latencies, defined as: 
Lp = tp – tinj (10) 
Ld = td – tp (11) 
Lr = tr – td (12) 
 
where tp is the time instant when the fault is visible at the 
signals of the external structural architecture, tinj is the 
injection time instant, td is the time instant when the error is 
detected by the detection mechanisms, and tr is the time 
instant when the recovery mechanisms finish the recovery 
process. 
Similarly to the detection and recovery coverages, we can 
calculate the latencies of each detection and recovery 
mechanism: Ld(Parity), Ld(WDT), Lr(Boff), Lr(CP) and Lr(Spare). 
VI. FAULT-INJECTION EXPERIMENTS RESULTS 
Table II and Table III contain the results of the experiment. 
The first column of Table II shows the percentage of activated 
errors for single and multiple faults, and for both workloads. It 
can be observed that multiple faults have much more impact 
than single faults, with values near 100%. This is an expected 
result, as multiple faults affect several places at the same time. 
This trend is fulfilled in the two workloads, with small 
differences between them. 
Table II also shows the detection coverages (columns 
Cd(mech) and Cd(sys)). We make several observations. First, Cd(sys) 
is very high, over 90%. This means that most activated errors 
are detected or non effective (see Fig. 5). Second, Cd(mech) is 
lower, especially in single faults. In multiple faults, Cd(mech) 
present values near Cd(sys). And finally, as expected, detection 
coverages are higher for multiple faults than for single faults, 
as multiple faults provoke a higher impact. The percentage of 
non detected errors that provoke a failure (1 – Cd(sys)) is very 
low. Thus, we can conclude that the detection process works 
quite well. Furthermore, Table II presents the detection 
coverage of the different EDMs. As it can be seen, Cd(Parity) is 
much greater than Cd(WDT). This indicates that most errors are 
detected by the parity mechanism. 
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Last, Table II also contains the average detection latencies, 
both global and separated by mechanisms. We point up that 
Ld(Parity) is much lower than Ld(WDT), because WDT involves 
the timer overflow, and that the global detection latency is 
reduced by the influence of the parity mechanism, as it is the 
most frequently activated EDM. 
From the results of detection coverages and latencies, WDT 
has demonstrated to be a poorly efficient and slow detection 
mechanism in our system. This suggests that detection can be 
improved by replacing it with other detection techniques, such 
as parity in CPU registers and buses, as well as implementing 
CPU exceptions. In this way, Cd(mech) for single faults can also 
be increased. 
Let us now see the recovery coverages and latencies shown 
in Table III (Cr(mech) and Cr(sys)) for single and multiple faults, 
and for both workloads. We observe that recovery coverages 
(Cr) are lower than detection coverages (Cd), because a 
fraction of the detected errors cannot be recovered by the 
recovery mechanisms (see Fig. 5). Most of them provoke 
failures and a small portion is recovered by the intrinsic 
redundancy of the system. It is also noticeable that Cr(sys) is 
greater than Cr(mech), because Cr(sys) includes non effective 
errors. The difference is more pronounced in single faults than 
in multiple faults. Finally, we can observe that Cr(mech) in 
multiple faults is greater than Cr(mech) in single faults. Although 
multiple faults are most difficult to recover once they have 
been detected, they are more frequently detected. For this 
reason, Cr is bigger. This fact is not accomplished in Cr(sys), 
where we can observe lower values for multiple faults. 
In addition, we have verified a non-negligible percentage of 
failures provoked by detected but non recovered errors (see 
Fig. 5), mainly for multiple faults. We can conclude that the 
recovery process does not work as well as the detection 
process. 
On the other hand, Table III shows also the recovery 
coverage of the different ERMs. From the table, the spare and 
the backoff (retry) cycle are the most activated mechanisms, 
while the checkpointing (CP) is much less activated because it 
is related with the watchdog timer. The activation of the spare 
is especially high in multiple faults, because these faults are 
the most harmful and the system interprets them as permanent 
faults.  
Finally, Table III presents the average recovery latencies, 
both global and separated by mechanisms. Some points can be 
remarked. First, Lr is much greater than Ld, as Lr includes 
longer duration processes. Second, Lr(Boff) is smaller than Lr(CP) 
and both are much lower than Lr(Spare). CP includes the reading 
of the checkpoint from stable memory. Spare also adds the 
reconfiguration time to enable the backup CPU. And finally, 
Lr for single faults is lower than Lr for multiple faults. Single 
faults recover quicker than multiple faults because when 
multiple faults are present, the activation of the spare CPU is 
more frequent. 
From previous results, retry proves to be the ERM that 
presents the best coverage/latency compromise in our system. 
Also, its implementation cost is much lower than the spare’s. 
In fact, it is considered one of the best methods to tolerate 
intermittent faults [20]. 
Recovery latency must be a key factor to handle intermittent 
faults. High frequency intermittent faults may lead to a near 
coincident fault scenario, i.e. a new fault arrives before the 
handling of the previous one is completed, leading to the 
failure of the recovery process. In the following paragraphs, 
some proposals to reduce Lr are presented. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Fault pathology graph [4]. 
 
TABLE II.  

















Arith. Series Single 63.8 94.04 48.28 41.54 6.74 16.47 2.89 100.21 Multiple 99.4 99.70 93.06 77.77 15.29 13.48 1.18 76.04 
Bubblesort Single 57.5 92.35 36.70 33.22 3.48 10.34 3.21 78.47 Multiple 98.9 98.28 90.39 75.13 15.26 14.35 1.98 75.23 
 
TABLE III.  



















Arith. Series Single 87.62 41.85 17.71 2.51 21.63 96.26 10.1 37.83 173.59 Multiple 81.19 74.55 12.47 2.21 59.86 132.11 7.14 33.32 161.81 
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The first one is to increase the threshold that activates the 
spare CPU. In this way, some intermittent faults can be 
recovered by the retry or checkpoint techniques, instead of 
activating the spare CPU. Fig. 6 shows this idea, with different 
fault types and different threshold (T) values. For instance, T1 
and T2 thresholds activate erroneously the spare unit, as the 
system interprets long transient faults as well as some 
intermittent faults that disappear as permanent faults. On the 
other hand, T3 threshold activates the spare unit correctly, 
recovering thus permanent faults and long intermittent faults 
that become permanent or do not disappear. The difficulty of 
this approach is that the programming of the threshold 
depends on the transient duration and the intermittent burst 
length, and they are not easy to know a priori. They depend 
on the hardware technology and the environment. 
Nevertheless, at least we can estimate the maximum number 
of successive attempts before activating the spare CPU, that is 
related with the maximum value of T: 









As Cr(Boff) is much greater than Cr(CP), we can approximate 








Another possibility is to implement hot sparing instead of 
cold sparing. In this way, the time overhead related with 
reading the CP from stable memory is eliminated, reducing the 
reconfiguration latency. The disadvantage of this option is the 
power consumption overhead introduced. For instance, dual 
systems with hot sparing are typical of self-checking flight 
computers in aircraft flight control systems [21], where the 
response time is critical. 
It is also feasible to introduce Error Correcting Codes 
(ECC) into the memory and the critical registers of the CPU in 
order to improve the recovery from parity detection. 
Particularly, Flexible Unequal Error Control Codes (FUEC) 
[22] can be good candidates to cope with intermittent faults, as 
this type of fault can present unequal error rates in different 
parts of the data word. 
Finally, applying triple modular redundancy (TMR) [3] [23] 
in selected components of the CPU would allow masking 
transient and short intermittent faults. Although this technique 
may introduce a high hardware overhead, it can take 
advantage of the increasing integration density of current deep 
sub-micron technologies. 
Some authors suggest that hardware implemented error 
handling techniques are likely to provide the best solutions to 
mitigate the effects of intermittent faults [2], [13]. The high 
speed of silicon logic makes hardware implementations well 
suited for detection and correction of high rate errors. In 
addition, hybrid solutions, which combine hardware error 
detection and recovery with software implemented failure 
prediction and resource reconfiguration, may improve 
dependability significantly [2]. 
VII. MARKOV MODELS FOR DEPENDABILITY EVALUATION 
In this section, we show Markov models generated for our 
fault-tolerant system in the presence of intermittent faults, in 
order to evaluate their dependability. To calculate the 
transition rates of the Markov chains, we have used the 
coverage values presented in Table II and Table III The final 
objective is to obtain the reliability and safety of the FT 
system and compare it with other FT approaches (see Fig. 1). 
Particularly, we compare the original duplex-cold-sparing 
system with other configurations using warm and hot sparing. 
An element with an intermittent fault is usually represented 
by a two-state Markov model [23], [24]. The two states are a 
failed state and a pseudo-failed state. In the first state, the fault 
is active, and using the element produces an incorrect output. 
In the second state, the fault is in a benign mode, and the 
output is not corrupted when using this element. An 
intermittent fault oscillates between these two states with a 
frequency that depends on the characteristics of the fault. 
Taking the previous considerations into account, we have 
generated the Markov chain shown in Fig. 7 for a duplex 
system with cold sparing. The intermittent fault oscillation is 
observed between states 2 and 3, which corresponds to failed 
(active) and pseudo-failed (benign) states, respectively. The 
meaning of the different states and transition parameters is 
summarized in the figure. The expression of transition rates 
will be explained later in a simplified chain. 
 
 





Long intermittent that becomes
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A drawback of this type of model is that the on-off cycles of 
intermittent faults must be modeled, and the associated 
parameters have to be measured. It is very difficult to obtain 
realistic estimation of the rates α and β. The unpredictable 
behavior of intermittent faults may also impose an update on 
the parameters [20]. 
Another problem is stiffness, which appears in Markov 
models with transition rates that differ by several orders of 
magnitude. In our case, α and β are usually much higher than 
the fault rate λ. Stiffness causes numerical difficulties when 
solving the differential equations that arise from the Markov 
model [26]. 
To overcome these issues, some authors suggest the 
elimination of the intermittent cycles and the generation of a 
Markov chain only with coverages [24], [25], [26]. Although 
the resulting model is considerably simpler, it can be much 
more accurate because it relies only on parameters that are 
directly observable. Fig. 8 shows a simplified version of the 
chain after removing fast loops to solve the stiffness problem. 
As mentioned, the coverages have been obtained from the 
results of the fault injection experiments, analyzed in Section 
VI. 
The activated error rate is calculated as λactiv = λ×Act, where 
Act is the percentage of activated errors (see (1)) and λ is the 
intermittent fault rate, that is to say, the arrival rate of 
intermittent faults. 
The coverages of the chain were also defined in Section 
V.H, and Cr(Spare) = Cr(mech) – (Cr(Boff) + Cr(CP)), as pointed in (7). 
From the expression of the coverages (Section V.H) and the 
fault pathology graph (see Fig. 5), we can demonstrate the 























(u.t: unit of 
time). So, λactivCr(Spare) is the rate of activated errors that are 









































































So, λactiv(1–Cd(sys)) is the rate of activated errors that are 





































































λactiv(Cd(mech)–Cr(mech)) is the rate of activated errors that are 
detected but non recovered, producing a failure. 
Transition 2F: 
This transition is the same as the 1→F transition, but for the 
reconfigured processor. 
Transition 2FS: 
This transition is similar to the 1→FS transition, but for the 
reconfigured processor. In this case, the term λactivCr(Spare) is 
added. As the spare unit is exhausted, the activated errors that 
would be detected and recovered by the spare mechanism also 
produce a failure. Note that this model is also valid for 
transient and permanent faults, just changing the 
corresponding coverages (Cd(mech), Cd(sys), Cr(mech) and Cr(Spare)), 
as well as the activated error rate (λactiv). Thus, the model is 
versatile and general for any fault type. 
To solve the chain, we use the Semi-Markov Unreliability 
Range Evaluator (SURE) tool [27]. SURE is a reliability 
analysis program developed at NASA Langley Research 
Center. This software is especially suited for the analysis of 
fault-tolerant reconfigurable systems. We specifically use 
WinSURE, a Windows version of SURE. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Markov model for a duplex system with cold sparing and intermittent faults. 
 
1: All good / non effective / recovered by Backoff (retry) 
or Checkpoint
2: Main processor failed (active)
3: Main processor pseudo-failed (benign)
4: Main processor failed and replaced by the spare 
processor
5: Main (replaced) processor failed (active)
6: Main processor (replaced) pseudo-failed (benign)
FS: Safe failure
F:Unsafe failure
λ: Intermittent fault rate
λactiv: Activated error rate
α: Rate active intermittent fault goes benign
β: Rate benign intermittent fault goes active
Cd (mech): Coverage of the detection mechanisms
Cdsys): Global system detection coverage
Cr(mech): Coverage of the recovery mechanisms
Cr(spare):Coverage of the Spare recovery mechanism
Cr(Boff): Coverage of the Backoff  recovery mechanism






















Fig. 8. Markov model for a duplex system with cold sparing eliminating fast loops to solve the stiffness problem. 
 
From the results obtained in Section VI, and taking into 
account the variations due to the fault multiplicity 
(single/multiple faults), as well as the workload, for the 
Markov chain in Fig. 8 we have selected the coverage values 
shown in Table IV. 
 
TABLE IV. 
COVERAGE VALUE SELECTION FOR THE MARKOV CHAIN IN FIG. 8 
 
Sample values Typical value 
Cd(mech) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 0.8 
Cd(sys) 0.92, 0.94, 0.96, 0.98, 1.00 0.96 
Cr(mech) 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8 0.7 
Cr(Spare) 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 0.4 
 
Some comments about the coverage values should be made. 
On the one hand, all coverages are normalized with respect to 
the number of activated errors (Nact). This fact explains that Cd 
> Cr >> Cr(Spare). It can seem that 0.4 is an unacceptably low 
value for Cr(Spare), but remember that 
Cr(mech) = Cr(Boff) + Cr(CP) + Cr(Spare) (see (7)). 
So Cr(Spare) is a portion of Cr(mech). It represents the fraction of 
all activated errors that are detected and recovered by one of 
the ERMs, the spare. Table III shows the values of Cr(Spare). 
On the other hand, in the selection of typical values, we 
have chosen a representative “average” value from the 
variations of the fault multiplicity and the workload. We have 
taken into account the increasing trend of the probability of 
occurrence of multiple faults as feature size shrinks. This 
consideration makes the coverage values grow slightly. 
For the intermittent fault rate λ, we have used a typical 
value of 10-4 [25]. From Table II, we have selected an 
“average” value for the percentage of activated errors Act = 
0.8. So, λactiv = λ × Act = 10-4 x 0.8. 
Next, some results obtained by solving the Markov model 
with WinSURE are shown. System reliability and safety have 
been calculated. Next we deduce the expressions for reliability 
(R) and safety (S) from Fig. 8. 
The reliability is defined as the probability that the system 
works correctly at a given time [3]. Thus: 
R = P1 + P2 
The safety is defined as the probability that the system 
works correctly, or fails in a safe-controlled way. Then: 
S = P1 + P2 + PFS = R + PFS 
 
Fig. 9 shows the reliability and the safety as a function of 
time. We observe that: 
• R and S decrease exponentially with time. R tends 
asymptotically to 0, and S tends asymptotically to 
Cd(mech). This is an expected behavior, characteristic of 
Markov chains with coverages [23]. 
• S is much greater than R, and the difference grows with 
time. Remember that S = R + PFS. 
• For low time values, R and S present acceptable values, 
over 0.99. 
• However, R degrades excessively (R < 0.6) from about 
26000 hours (almost 3 years). This shows the necessity 




Fig. 9. Dependability variation with time. duplex with cold sparing. 
 
Table V shows the detailed values of R and S for some 
representative time values. Acceptable results are observed for 
10h and 1 week. On the other hand, a large degradation of R is 
observed for high time values, with values under 0.5. 
We have also analyzed how the variation of the coverages 
affects R and S, in order to improve system dependability (see 
Fig.10). We have found that R is sensitive to both Cr(mech) and 
Cd(sys), with similar slopes. On the other hand, Cd(sys) is the 
coverage that most improves S. Small increases in the 
detection coverage yield a significant variation of S. 
 
TABLE V. 
VALUES OF R AND S FOR TYPICAL TIME CASES 
Time R S 
10h 0.9998879551 0.9999680018 
1 week 0.9981058140 0.9994629120 







CC += , (see (5)), it is necessary to 
augment Cd(mech) (by improving the fault detection 
mechanisms) to enhance Cd(sys). 
Let us suppose that the cold sparing system is included in a 
1: All good // non effective // detected and recovered by 
Backoff (retry) or Checkpoint




λactiv: Activated error rate
Cd (mech): Coverage of the detection mechanisms
Cd(sys): Global system detection coverage
Cr(mech): Coverage of the recovery mechanisms
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long-life unmanned spacecraft (such as a satellite or a deep-
space planetary probe). Space probes typically use duplex 
systems with cold standby sparing in the Attitude Control 
Subsystem, and duplex systems with hot standby sparing in 
the Command and Control Subsystem [28]. In this case, it is 
mandatory to improve R. On the other hand, S is not a critical 
metric since no human life is involved. So effort should be 
focused on improving Cr(mech) by the optimization of the 
ERMs. Some proposals have been commented in Section VI 
when analyzing the coverages results.  
On the other hand, suppose that the cold sparing system is 
included in the flight control system of a space shuttle (with 
mission time about 1 week) or a civil aircraft (with flight time 
about 10h). They are safety critical systems with human life 
involved. Besides having a high reliability, special care with 
safety must be taken into account. In these cases, EDMs 
should be enhanced in order to improve Cd(sys). 
To sum up, the generic problem of dependability 
assessment can be formulated in this way: Given an 
application (system) with operation (life) time t, which values 
of Cd/Cr are needed in order to achieve required levels for 
R/S? This can determine whether the EDMs/ERMs are 
effective enough or if they must be improved instead. In the 
last case, a feedback process is applied, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Finally, we will compare the duplex cold sparing with other 
fault-tolerant reconfiguration approaches, such as warm and 
hot sparing. In Section VI we have commented that Lr is a key 
parameter to tolerate intermittent faults, mainly due to the 
possibility of near coincident scenarios. We have said also that 
a possible solution to reduce Lr is to introduce sparing variants 
such as hot or warm sparing. Hot sparing is a typical 
configuration on critical systems where recovery must be done 
as soon as possible [28]. Let us see how R and S are affected 
by these variants. These techniques can be good alternatives to 
improve the tolerance against intermittent faults if R and S 
stay at acceptable values. 
Fig. 11 shows the Markov model for warm sparing, 
including the explanation of states and transition parameters. 
This model has been generated taking as reference the cold 
sparing model in Fig. 8, adding the state 3 and some 
transitions. The key difference is the fault rate of the primary 
(λp) and the backup (λb) processors. In cold sparing, λb = 0, 
because the backup unit is inactive. λb < λp in warm sparing, 
due to the fact that the backup unit is active, but less than the 
primary unit. In hot sparing, λb = λp = λ, because both units 
run the same tasks simultaneously. Hence, the model is also 
valid for hot sparing, making λb = λp. 
Different activated error rates are defined for both the 
primary (main) and the backup (spare) processor: 
λpactiv = Actp x λp 
λbactiv = Actb x λb 
where Actp and Actb are the percentage of activated errors for 
the primary and the backup processors, respectively. They can 
be obtained by applying fault injection, as it has been done for 
Act. 
The transition rates between states can be deduced from the 
expression of the coverages, as it was done for the cold 
sparing model. 
Transition 13: 
λbactiv(1–Cd(sys)) represents the rate of activated errors in the 
backup unit that are non-detected and produce a failure in this 
unit. 
 
     
Fig. 10. Sensitivity of reliability and safety to coverages. Duplex with cold sparing. Time = 168h. 
 
 























































λpactiv: Activated error rate of the main processor
λbactiv: Activated error rate of the backup processor
Cd (mech): Coverage of the detection mechanisms
Cdsys): Global system detection coverage
Cr(mech): Coverage of the recovery mechanisms
Cr(spare):Coverage of the Spare recovery mechanism
1: All good // non effective // detected and recovered by 
Backoff (retry) or Checkpoint
2: Main processor failed and replaced by the spare 
processor // Spare failed and detected










λpactiv Cr(Spare)+ λbactiv (Cd(mech)-Cr(mech))
λpactiv (1-Cd(sys))
λpactiv [(Cd(mech)-Cr(mech))+Cr(Spare)]
λpactiv [(1-Cd(sys))+ Cr(Spare)] 
λpactiv (Cd(mech)-Cr(mech))




])1[( )()( Sparersysdpactiv CC +−λ  has two contributions: 
• (1–Cd(sys)), the activated errors in the primary unit that are 
non-detected and provoke a failure. 
• λpactivCr(Spare), the activated errors in the primary unit that 
would be detected and recovered by the spare 
mechanism. In this case, the system tries to reconfigure 
with the backup unit, but this unit is failed. 
Transition 3FS: 
λpactiv(Cd(mech)–Cr(mech)) is the rate of activated errors in the 
primary unit that are detected but non recovered. This 
provokes a safe failure, because the errors are detected. 
Transition 12: 
It has two contributions: 
• λpactivCr(Spare), that has the same meaning as in the cold 
system. It indicates the rate of activated errors that are 
detected and recovered by the spare mechanism. 
• λbactiv(Cd(mech)–Cr(mech)), that indicates the activated errors 
in the backup unit that are detected but non recovered. In 
this case, they produce a failure in the backup unit while 
the primary unit is correct. 
 
The remaining transitions coincide with the cold sparing 
model, using λpactiv. This model is also valid for transient and 
permanent faults, by simply changing the corresponding 
coverage values and the activated error rates. 
To solve the model, the following parameters values have 
been applied: 
• λpactiv = Actp x λp = 0.8 x 10-4 
• λbactiv = Actb x λb = 0.5 x 10-5 
Notice that λb < λp and Actb < Actp. 
According to the system to analyze, the values of the 
coverages can be different. Warm and hot sparing usually 
include additional EDMs, such as monitoring between the 
processors as well as comparison in hot sparing. In this case, 
the detection coverages increase. We have assumed that: 
• Cd(mech)hot > Cd(mech)warm > Cd(mech)cold 
• Cd(sys)hot > Cd(sys)warm > Cd(sys)cold 
 
Table VI summarizes the values of the coverages used for 
the three systems. 
 
TABLE VI.  
COVERAGE VALUES FOR THE COMPARISON OF HOT, WARM AND COLD 
SPARING 
Coverages hot warm cold 
Cd(mech) 0.95 0.85 0.8 
Cr(mech) 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Cd(sys) 0.99 0.97 0.96 
Cr(spare) 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Fig. 12 shows the reliability (R) as a function of time, for 
the three types of sparing. We observe: 
• An asymptotic exponential decrease, with R(∞)→0, in 
the three systems. 
• Rcold > Rwarm > Rhot. This is an expected result, since the 
fault probability is bigger when the spare unit is active 
(hot) or pseudo-active (warm).  
• Differences increase with time. Prior to 4500 hours 
(about 6 months), R > 0.9 with small differences between 
the three systems. After about 18000 hours (about 2 
years), Rhot degrades below 0.6. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Reliability variation with time. Comparison of cold, warm and hot 
sparing. 
 
Fig. 13 shows the safety (S) as a function of time, for the 
three types of sparing. We notice: 
• An asymptotic exponential decrease, but with 
R(∞)→Cd(mech). The same trend has been observed for 
cold, warm and hot sparing. S values are much greater 
than R values. Values near or higher than 0.9 are 
observed for all mission times. 
• Shot > Swarm > Scold. This is because the detection 
coverage is bigger in hot and warm. 
• Differences grow with time, although they are not high. 
 
 




From these results, we can conclude that for short-medium 
times hot (or warm) sparing may be acceptable solutions to 
reduce Lr, because R does not degenerate excessively. In 
addition, S shows better values than in cold sparing. For long 
times, R degrades too much. It should be necessary to improve 
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It is important to notice that, independently of the particular 
results obtained for reliability and safety, the methodology 
presented is general, and it can be applied to any fault-tolerant 
system at an early phase of the design. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have presented a study of the dependability 
assessment of a fault-tolerant system against intermittent 
faults. This study is motivated by the increasing incidence of 
intermittent faults in deep submicron technologies. The fault-
tolerant microcomputer system studied is duplex with cold 
sparing. This redundancy technique is often used in both long-
life unmanned spacecraft systems and high-availability 
transactional processing systems. We have applied VHDL-
based fault injection due to its flexibility, as well as the high 
observability and controllability of all the modeled 
components. 
Detection and recovery coverages and latencies have been 
calculated in order to assess the fault-tolerance mechanisms. 
Among the applied detection/recovery mechanisms, parity and 
retry have shown the best coverage-latency compromise. 
Finally, some Markov models have been generated to evaluate 
the dependability of the fault-tolerant system. Coverages have 
been introduced in the Markov model and dependability 
attributes (reliability and safety) have been calculated. Results 
have been compared with warm and hot sparing. From the 
results obtained, and considering the reconfiguration latency 
as a key factor to cope with intermittent faults, it is suggested 
to use hot sparing for short-medium operation times. The 
Markov models generated are flexible and general, and they 
can be applied also to manage transient and permanent faults 
with no modification of the chain; instead, only coverage 
values must be changed. 
The methodology presented is general, and it can be applied 
to any fault-tolerant system at an early phase of the design. An 
iterative improvement of the detection and recovery 
mechanisms can be achieved, following a feedback process. 
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